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Stimatz: Stare Decisis —The Montana Doctrine

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
STARE DECISIS-

THE MONTANA DOCTRINE

Due either to misapprehension or misapplication, the doctrine of stare decisis' has just emerged from a succession of buffetings and probings, the most serious in its some four-hundred
year history. Many, holding that it is a mortmain doctrine leading inexorably to the stagnation of the common law, have vehemently urged its discard. Others, regarding it as a paternal,
albeit severe guiding hand, have just as fiercely demanded its
retention intact. But out of the conflict have come ameliorating
views which urge the doctrine be reset in its proper perspective
and retained while insuring at the same time that the harsh and
stagnating tendencies be replaced with a true growth principle.
It is the boast of the common law that it is flexible and adaptable
to the needs of the times. The need today, no less than in days
gone by, is for a system of law which can supply a growth principle and still retain that degree of stability necessary for the
survival of a highly complex civilization. Cardozo summed the
problem up very well in these words:
"The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger
of antitheses, the synthesis of opposites, these are the
great problems of the law .... We fancy ourselves to be

dealing with some ultra-modern controversy, the product
of the clash of interests in an industrial society. The
problem is laid bare, and at its core are the ancient mysteries crying out for understanding-rest and motion,
the one and the many, the self and the not-self, freedom
and necessity, reality and appearance, the absolute and
the relative. We have the claims of stability to be harmonized with those of progress. We are to reconcile
liberty with equality, and both of them with order....
The precedent or the statute, though harsh, is to be
obeyed, yet obeyed also . . . are to be the meliorating

precepts of equity and conscience.
The solution to these seeming contradictions lies not within
the field of law alone but also within the fields of philosophy,
2"A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge, made after argument on a question of law fairly arising in a case, and necessary to its
determination, is an authority, or binding precedent, in the same court
or in other courts of equal or lower rank, in subsequent cases, where
'the very point' is again in controversy; but the degree of authority
belonging to such a precedent depends, of necessity, on its agreement
with the spirit of the times or the judgment of subsequent tribunals
upon its correctness as a statement of the existing or actual law, and
the compulsion or exigency of the doctrine is, in the last analysis, moral
and intellectual, rather than arbitrary or inflexible."-CHAMBERLAIN,
STARx Docisis, p. 19.
2
THE PARADOXES or LuGAL SciEucn pp. 4-5 (1927).
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psychology and the other fields of human relations. The field
of law is but a part of the whole. If instead of putting law in
a mental straight-jacket, law is viewed as having essence and
existence (in the philosophical sense) then a sound basis for resolving these conflicts becomes available. But to reach a solution
there remains the necessity of giving content to this unchangeable essence and changing existence. Both speculative and practical effort is here needed."
The attempt to limit "law" to a single, well-defined concept' has been productive of needless confusion and has seriously
retarded the "patterned progress" of the common law. It is
self-evident that law contemplates a law-maker and a law-obeyer,
for the main purpose of law (whatever its essence is deemed to
be) is to regulate human conduct. If there is no one who is to
obey, then the law-maker is indulging in empty rhetoric. And
it has been just such empty rhetoric emanating from those obsessed, consciously or subconsciously, with the idea of law for
law's sake which has led to a great deal of the dissatisfaction and
adverse criticism of the doctrine of stare decisis.
The nature of law is uniquely important in a consideration
of the doctrine of precedent because it gives character and form
to the entire judicial process. Despite the conflicting and multifarious views on the subject, enough has been given general acceptance to provide a working basis. Enough general agreement
also obtains as to what constitutes a precedent, when it can be
overruled, and the force and value to be assigned it.5
Our concern with the doctrine of precedent is the effect to
be given an overruling decision.' Not until the Montana decision,
'Ohroust and Collins, Basic Ideas in the Philosophy of Law of St.
Thomas Aquinas, 26 MARQ. L. RBv. 18 (1941). See also Dr. Chroust's
article, On the Nature of Natural Law in INTEBPRETATIONS OF MODERN
LEoAL PHILOSOPHIES (Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound), Sayre, ed.,

pp. 70-84 (1947).
6"Most of the discussion as to the nature of law which has been the
staple of Anglo-American writing on jurisprudence has suffered from
an initial false assumption that 'law' is a single simple conception; that
the one short word has one simple analytically-ascertainable meaning.
As one reads the voluminous literature upon this subject he soon feels
that the disputants are speaking of different things, although calling
them by one name."-Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV.
L. Rsv. 643 (1923).
'15 C. J. Courts § 302 et. seq.; 21 C.J.S. Courts § 186 et. 8eq.; 14 AM.
Jua., Courts, §§ 59 to 83.
OTo be strictly accurate the word "case" instead of "decision" should be
used, but in the literature the word "decision" predominates. See
BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, §§ 6-10 (1912) ; and GOODHART,
ESSAYS IN

JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW,

pp. 1-26 (1931)

for

what in a case constitutes a precedent.
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soon to be noted, was this precise "point" of the effect treated
squarely, though beginning as early as 1853' and regularly ever
since, the "effect" was considered in varying degrees of indirectness. The rule which has been and still is accepted by the
majority of America courts is that retroactive effect must be
given an overruling decision.' This necessity' has traditionally
been ascribed to the Blackstonian, or "declaratory theory"' of
law which holds that when a case is overruled no new law is declared but the old law is vindicated from misrepresentation; not
that the old was bad law, but that it was never law.' The courts
then accepted as inevitable that a void would result between an
'Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. 416 (1853), which
in dicta on p. 432 supplied the basis for the "municipal bond" cases the
most important of which were Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175
(1863), and Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677 (1879), especially
at p. 687 at top beginning "The true rule. ..

."

Next in importance

were the "legal tender" cases Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, 19 L.
Ed. 513 (1870), and Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871).
Other interesting cases on varied *oints of the "effect" are: Farrior v.
New England Mortgage Security '., 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532 (1891);
Muhlker v. Harlem RR, 197 U.S. 5 ' (1905) ; Hill v. Brown, 144 N.C.
117, 56 S.E. 693 (1907). See any ot lie law review articles cited in
footnote 15 for a complete citation, as t Nthese two: Carpenter, Court
Decision8 and the Common Law, 17 CoL . REv. 593 (1917), and Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of
Overruling Decisions, 18 CoL L. REv. 230 (1918).
'Cases denying retroactive application by way of exception give the
rule a progeny so numerous and so exceedingly strange that chaos
reigns. Theories advanced to explain the deviations from the rule have
been abandoned, picked up, combined and re-abandoned. Prof. Snyder
in Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. at
pp. 130-148 (1941) traces the history with full case citations of these
exceptions and concludes that there exists no constitutional basis, and
that the only consistent basis is to be found in what the courts in the
cases themselves have called the "principles of justice." These "principles of justice" he says are rooted in that same principle underlying
the constitutional guaranty against ex post facto legislation. He is
careful to point out that it is the principle behind the guaranty not the
guaranty itself which gives validity to the exception to the rule. See
also Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. at 451 (1924) ; and the articles
by Kocourek and Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare
Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REV. at pp. 987-990 (1935) ; Spruill, The Effect of an
Overruling Decision, 18 N. CAR. L. Rv. pp. 209-220 (1940) ; and Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in ConstitutionalLaw,
38 MIcH. L. Rv. 30 (1939).
'Is attacked and. repudiated as being a fallacious and unwarranted appendage to the declaratory theory. Kocourek and Koven (supra,n. 8 at
p. 985) say "that the retrospective feature of the declaratory theory is
an importation which is antithetical to the very purposes of stare
decisis."
"Briefly, that a judge does not make law but only declares the law as
he finds it.
"BLAcKsTONE,

COMMENTARIES §§ 68-71 (Cooley's ed., 1879).
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overruled and overruling decision unless retroactive effect were
given the overruling decision."
It will be seen on slight reflection that the matter of the
effect to be given an overruling decision is at the pinnacle of the
judicial process. Before the peak is reached much has already
transpired. The ladder of decision is anchored in the nature of
law; the rungs are the various theories and mechanics of the
judicial process, none of which can be minimized or ignored
without injuring and distorting the whole." It is, moreover, at
this pinnacle of decision where it appears most readily whether
justice or injustice has been done. If one keeps in mind the
difference between cause and effect, it becomes clear why the
dissatisfaction with the doctrine of stare decisis has centered
around the application which is to be given the overruling decision. For here is the immediate effect of the judicial process;
the cause is often obscured in the intricacies of the process and
the base on which it rests. The continuing failure to solve this
problem of application will result in having fashioned an elaborate institution which dispenses injustice. It may be likened to
the chain of activities of a fireman mounting an ice-covered ladder, climbing high into the air, entering a burning building and
making his way through billowing smoke and intense heat to
rescue a life-size doll and inadvertently leaving the child behind.
Both the law and the fireman come away from such an event
with a poignant sense of futility and self-defeat.
It was precisely on this point of the effect to be given an
overruling decision that the Montana Supreme Court addressed
itself in 1932 in deciding the case of Montana Horse Products Co.
v. Great Northern Railway Co." This decision propounded an
ameliorating view of the doctrine of stare decisis. The action of
the Montana court has drawn high praise from virtually every
"In so doing the courts ignored the patent "operative fact" of the appearance of law which the overruled decision had. Retroaction very
often instead of bridging the void has opened the floodgates of confusion and hardship to fill it.
"Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoL. L. REV. at p. 1015
(1928) suggests that law is a power which operates through rules;
that law is something different from the machinery through which it
operates; that the machinery is not to be minimized but that it is to be
recognized as being only machinery. He further suggests that a "decision of a case is no more law than the light from last night's lamp is
electricity"; that we make use of decisions, statutes and constitutions
for the purpose of passing desirable judgments and use these and other
devices in order to make the judgments effectual.
"91 Mont. 194, 7 P. (2d) 919 (1932).
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writer on the subject,' and a growing number of state courts are
adopting this solution." The one dissenting voice' among the
25

More than twenty-five writers in various law reviews have discussed
the Montana approach to this aspect of stare decisis. The following appeared as case comments shortly after the Sunburst case was reported:
28 IL.r L. REv. 277,17 MINN. L. REV. 811, 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 528, 11
N. CA. L. REv. 323, 42 YAT.E L. J. 779; and two later ones: 25 VA. L.
REv. 210 (1939), and 27 IA. L. Rnv. 316 (1942). Of the later, more extensive articles the most important are: Aumann, Judicial Law Making
and Stare Deci8ai, 21 Ky. L. J. 156 (1933) ; Catlett, The Development
of the Doctrine of Stare Deci~is and the Extent to Which It Should Be
Applied, 21 WASH. L. Rnv. 158 (1946) ; Covington, The American Doctrine of Stare Deoisi8, 24 TEx. L. REv. 190 (1945); Douglas, Stare
Deci8is, 49 CoT.. L. Rv. 735 (1949) ; Green, The Development of the
Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 40 ILm L. REv. 303 (1946) ; Grinnell, Judicial Regulation of Stare
Deciai8, 24 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 150 (1940) ; Kocourek and Koven, supra
n. 8; Lobinger, Precedent in Past and Present Legal Systems, 44 MIcH.
L. Rnv. 955 (1946); Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare
Decisis and Law of the Case, 21 TEx. L. REV. 514 (1943); Shartel,
Stare Deciai8s-A PracticalView, 17 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 6 (1933) ; Snyder,
upra,n. 8; Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisi8
and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 31 A. B. A. JouR. 501
(1945, Ross Essay Winner) ; Spruill, supra, n. 8; Stimson, supra, n. 8;
A Symposium on: The Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14
CINN. L. REv. 203 (1940).
2
ONo effort has been made to trace the extent to which the doctrine has
been accepted by each state, but each of the following cases has cited
the Sunburst case and the courts have expressed their accord with the
idea that the power to decide the effect of an overruling decision lies
within their discretion. Kentucky has many more decisions along this
line than any other state and has, in fact, preceded Montana in stating
the doctrine. But as noted before, it was not until the Sunburst case
that the "very point" was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
states are listed alphabetically: Duhame v. State Tax Commission, 65
Ariz. 268, 179 P. (2d) 252 at 260 (1947) ; Kern v. City of Long Beach,
29 Cal. (2d) 850, 179 P. (2d) 799 at 800 (1947) ; World Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S.W. (2d) 848 at 852 (1939).;
Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., (La. App.) 146 So. 753 at 756
(1933) ; State v. Jones, 44 N. Mex. 623, 107 P. (2d) 324 at 329 (1940) ;
Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197 I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131,
156 P. (2d) 340 at 354 (1945). Cited as dicta in City Affairs Committee of Jersey City v. Board of Commissioners, 134 N.J. Law 180, 46 A.
(2d) 425 at 430 (1946). Two cases which are in accord but do not cite
Sunburst are Cooper v. Hawkins, 234 Ala. 636, 176 So. 329 (1937) ;
Culpepper v. Culpepper, 147 Fla. 632, 3 So. (2d) 330 (1941) ; Federal
case which treats of the subject in some detail is Warring v. Colpoys,
74 App. D.C. 303, 122 F. (2d) 642, 136 A.L.R. 1025 (1941). Sunburst
case is discussed in footnotes on p. 645.
1Comment in 47 H~Av. L. REv. 1403 (1935). The writer reiterates the
objections made by Von Moschzisker in Stare Decisis in Courts of Last
Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409 (1924) at 426, that this is (1) outright
legislation by the courts, (2) dicta, (3) ineffective as a practical remedy since no one would sue because the overruling would provide no
relief for his dispute. Most of the articles referred to in n. 15, 8upra,
deal with these objections. Briefly, (1) there is no usurpation of legislative function because declaring law for the future is no more judicial legislation than is declaring law for the past, both are merely the
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writers repeats objections uttered eight years prior to the decision, and adds a new one,' but on the whole does not seem entirely out of sympathy with this method of solving the problem.
On appeal from the district court the Horse Products case
was consolidated with the Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great
Northern Railway Co. case, since each involved the same primary
situation, and the cases were argued and presented to the Montana Supreme Court together. Most of the court's opinion is
given within the pages of the Horse Products case whereas the
Sunburst case was the one taken to the United States Supreme
Court." In discussing the cases, a reference to either is to be regarded as including the other.
In these cases an action was brought by a shipper to recover
from the carrier on freight rates paid as set forth in a schedule
approved by the Board of Railroad Commissioners.' The shipper was allowed to recover despite the fact that the grounds on
which it rested its case were expressly overruled. This seeming
anomaly is explained by the fact that in 1921 the court in decidexercise of a legitimate judicial power in the making of law which in
no way encroaches on the traditional legislative function. For an early
and standard treatment of this see Thayer, Judicial Legislation: 1t8
Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 HARV.
L. RE;v. 172 (1891). (2) If dicta, it is judicial not obiter and is entitled to weight on its merits. It is also said that this is only the application of the theory of the declaratory judgment to a larger field:
the announcement of a rule for the future guidance of the community
and the court. (3) Parties, such as railroads and insurance companies,
who have continuing interests along certain lines will bring actions to
get a favorable rule for the future; cases will reach the supreme court
on other grounds and will have erroneous or outmoded precedents
which do not apply to the case at hand, and alert judges can take the
opportunity of purging the law of its "congealing humors." Furthermore, the force of this third objection very largely disappears if the
view be taken that either retrospective or prospective application be
given the overruling decision as circumstances indicate. In this way,
other items being equal, the one bringing the suit could be "rewarded"
by having the overruling decision apply to his dispute.
1847 HALV. L. REv. at 1412 to the effect that "retroaction, as an automatic
check upon overruling, serves to regulate the strength of stare decisis,
which is a product of the evolution of a workable balance between
certainty in law and its adaptability to new demands.. . ." But this begs
the question. The determination to overrule is independent of and precedes the determination of the effect of the overruling. Further, stare
decisis is not designed to perpetuate error nor to allow more harm than
good to come from it. Stability of law is enhanced instead of weakened
when "the law" from whatever source is held to rule for the period
when it was promulgated as law, rather than one day be obliterated
and a different guide for that period be substituted.
"91 Mont. 216, 7 P. (2d) 927 (1932) ; 287 U.S. 358, 77 L.Ed. 360, 53 S.Ct.
145, 85 A.L.R. 254 (1932).
2R.C.M. 1921, §§ 3779 to 3847, especially § 3810.
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ing the case of Doney v.Northern Pacific Railway Co.," which
dealt with a similar transaction and similar code sections," had
ambiguously indicated" that the shipper might recover under
these circumstances. In 1932 both the shipper and carrier maintained that the Doney case controlled. The court agreed saying'
"that decision properly understood and interpreted, is conclusive
in this case," and that ' "the language employed in the Doney
Case above noted [supra,n. 23] is not merely to be considered as
obiter dictum." Mr. Justice Galen speaking for the court in
the Horse Products case of the controverted paragraphs in the
Doney case went on to say:
"In view of the conclusions theretofore reached in
that opinion these paragraphs of the decision are not
supported by the language employed, by the plain language of our statutes, or by the primary holding in that
decision .... They are hereby expressly overruled, as is

also any other language in that opinion at variance with
this decision. Having written that opinion for the court,
the author hereof expresses apology for having misled
the profession, and welcomes this opportunity to correct
the error made in interpreting our statutes.' '
Since the shipper relied solely on this interpretation of the
statute as previously rendered, its case fell; nevertheless the
court allowed it to recover, and this was on the basis of reliance
as appears from its statement on page 211 of the Horse Products
opinion:
"We were then apparently satisfied with the corMont. 209, 199 P. 432 (1921).
R.C.M. 1907, §§ 4363 to 4399, especially § 4391.
2'Supra, n. 21 at p. 236:
"The reasoning in the above cases applies with equal force to our
statute and to the lack of jurisdiction of the courts to pass upon the
reasonableness of the rates and discriminations before the the commission has taken action thereon. In other words, before any shipper can
recover in the courts damages for excess rates or discriminations, the
discrimination or unreasonableness of the rate must first be passed
upon by the special tribunal expressly created and authorized by law
to handle such matters--the Railroad Commission.
"The fact that the Railroad Commission is not authorized, upon determining that a rate is unreasonable or discriminatory, to order reparation, does not prevent a shipper, after the rate has been so determined
by the special tribunal created for that express purpose, from maintaining an action in court to recover damages sustained by him as a result
of such unreasonable or discriminatory rate. His action is based upon
the fact that such rate has been so declared by the proper tribunal,
and the court merely determines the amount of damages, if any, sus2 tained."
ASupra, n. 14 at p. 203.
2m0
t

"Ii.,

at p. 210.

"Id., at pp. 205-206.
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rectness of the holding, and thenceforth the profession
and others were entitled to place reliance thereon. The
construction of the statutes made by this court in that
case had been acted upon by the shipper, the carrier, and
the Railroad Commission, and undoubtedly gave rise to
the procedure adopted by the shipper in this instance
and to the present cause of action. It would be manifestly unjust and improper to deprive the shipper of its
legal right to recover . . .as pronounced by this court
simply because of the later opinion expressed by this
court repudiating its former decision." (Italics supplied).
As to the carrier, the court said no injustice will be done,
nor will it be injured by now allowing the shipper to recover for
this reason:
"... . it must have appreciated its liability under the
holding of this court in the Doney case. Furthermore,
it appears that in reliance upon the holding... in that
case negotiations were under way by which the carrier
proposed to make settlement with the shipper ....
Though the Montana court felt itself bound in the Horse
Products case by the Doney case, it was nevertheless convinced
that its ruling in the Doney case was wrong and should be overruled otherwise error would be perpetuated. Yet to overrule
with retroactive effect would be unjust to the shipper since he
meticulously and deliberately followed the procedure set forth
by the court in the earlier case.' In denying a rehearing the
court quotes from 26 AM. & ENG. ENCY. LAW, 2d ed., p. 184:
"Where vital and important public or private rights
are concerned, and the decisions regarding them are to
have a direct and permanent influence on all future
time, it becomes the duty, as well as the right of the
court to consider them carefully and to allow no previous
error to continue if it can be corrected. The foundation
of the rule of stare decisis was promulgated on the
ground of public policy, and it would be an egregious
mistake to allow more harm than good from it. ' ' "
(Italics supplied).
'Id., p. 211.
"But clearer cases of reliance have been overruled with retroactive ef-

fect. See the Michigan trilogy: Kavanough v. Rabior, 222 Mich. 68,

192 N.W. 623 (1923) ; Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159
(1930) ; Donohue v. Russell, 264 Mich. 217, 249 N.W. 830 (1933) ; and
the Washington trilogy of Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 P. 851
(1906) ; City of Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 P. 1010 (1930);
Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 P. 112 (1930).

"Supra,n. 14 at p. 216.
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The Sunburst case reached the United States Supreme Court
on certiorari,' was heard and on December 5, 1932, was decided
and opinion rendered. The carrier attacked on the ground that
the Montana court's refusal to allow retroactive effect to the overruling decision deprived it of equal privileges and immunities.
In dismissing this argument, Justice Cardozo speaking for the
Court said:
"... there had been written into the statute a notice
to all concerned that payments exacted by a carrier in
conformity with a published tariff were subject to be
refunded if found thereafter . ..to be excessive and
unreasonable .... Carrier and shipper would be presumed to bargain with each other on the basis of existing
law ....The validity of the notice is no less because it
was written into the act by a process of construction.' '
And as to the contention of lack of due process:
"The petitioner is thus driven to the position that
the Constitution of the United States has been infringed
because the Doney case was disapproved, and yet, while
disapproved, was followed .... This is a case where a
court has refused to make its ruling retroactive, and the
novel stand is taken that the Constitution of the United
States is infringed by the refusal .... We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state
in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward
operation and that of relation backward. It may say
that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. ' '
Cardozo called this a "novel stand" because the general
mode of operation heretofore had been to plead lack of due
process when retroactive effect had been given, and not, as here,
denied. The significance of this decision is that there is no constitutional mandate or prohibition in regard to the effect given
an overruling decision. There is, instead, a clear affirmation
that the common law doctrine of adherence to precedent is a
matter lying solely within the discretion of each state court:
"The choice for any state may be determined by the
juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their
conceptions of law, its origin and nature. We review not
the wisdom of their philosophies, but the legality of
their acts. The State of Montana . . . in making this
80287 U.S. 580.
81287 U.S. at 362.
81
., at pp. 363-4.
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choice ... is declaring common law for those within her
borders .... If this is the common law doctrine of ad-

herence to precedent as understood and enforced by the
courts of Montana, we are not at liberty, for anything
contained in the constitution of the United States, to
thrust upon those courts a different conception either
of the binding force of precedent or of the meaning of
the judicial process.'
Up to this point the main concern has been with the
theoretical inquiry whether the courts had the power to determine the effect to be given an overruling decision or whether
they were inexorably bound to give retroactive effect to the overruling decision. We have come to see that there is no inherent
necessity upon a court from a common law or constitutional
standpoint to decide this in only one way. Moreover, to require
prospective application for every overruling decision would be
merely the substitution of one inflexible procedure for another
with no assurance that the old problems would not be replaced
by new ones equally as serious. Prospective application, while a
laudable advance in the common law technique of precedent, is
no panacea. There are instances when equity demands retroactive application as well. Attention, therefore, is now directed
to the practical matter of determining under what circumstances
the principle as announced in the overruling decision should be
made to serve in the future only and when it should also be made
to serve for the past.
Two general principles which bind every common law judge
are those obliging him to turn away from error and to follow
precedent. The power to overrule enables the judge to turn away
from error. He announces the correct principle by the overruling, and this principle will serve for the future. The duty
to follow precedent is in force only before the conclusion to
overrule is reached, but there does remain the "operative fact"
of the overruled decision. As to this "operative fact" the duty
to follow precedent is silent. It is precisely at this point that
the art of judging calls into use the utmost in talent and knowledge of the judge. The effect to be given an overruling decision
lies not with the legislature but in the exercise of "a wider and
wiser judicial discretion.'" It is essential not to confuse the
act of overruling with the effect of overruling.
In far the greater number of instances, only prospective effect will be given the overruling decision. This is so because in
'3Id., at pp. 365-6.
"Spruill, supra,n. 8 at p. 223.
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harmonizing' the two duties of a judge in accord with the fundamental conception of law as a rule of conduct it is plain that a
party is entitled to be judged by the state of the law, actual
or apparent, as it existed at the time he acted since that is the
only rule which he could reasonably be expected to know or discover. If the one acting did so in justifiable reliance' on the law
as promulgated by the official agencies of government, then the
only fair or reasonable effect to be given the overruling decision
is prospective. When both parties have acted in justifiable reliance on the existing law at the time of their transaction, and all
other things are equal, the application given the overruling decision should be that which allows the one bringing the action to
prevail. This on the theory' that the one who supplied the occasion" for the correction of the law ought to be rewarded.
Whether prospective or retrospective effect shall be given
an overruling decision appears to be primarily a study in reliance. Though there is much more to the doctrine of precedent
than "estoppel applied to court decisions,"' the theory of estoppel can very validly be applied to the effect to be given an overruling decision. In applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the
parties are often overlooked by the courts because the courts have
been prone to regard themselves as being "bound" to follow a
previous decision. Very little examination has been made of the
fact whether the parties now before the court knew or could
have known of these decisions. The law has generally been taken
to be the rule governing the conduct of the judge at the time he
makes the decision. But law, existing no more exclusively for
courts and lawyers than medicine does for hospitals and doctors,
is perverted by such application. The person whose conduct is
primarily sought to be regulated must be given the chief consideration in law. Thus, the importance of the principle of reliance becomes manifest.
In general, the type of case in which the principle of reliance
'Snyder, supra n. 8 at p. 150.
"With due allowance being given to the principles that neither ignorance
nor mistake of law excuses.
'Covington, supra n. 15 at p. 204.
'Grinnell, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power
Prescribe Rules of Evidence, 24 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 47 (1940) quoting
from Claud Mullins, IN QuE-st Or JUsTICE, pp. 241 and 251:

"I have often felt.., that in the central hall of the Royal Courts

of Justice ... there might well be erected a monument to the many

thousands of litigants, whose names have been appended to 'leading'
cases, and whose pockets have been searched for the privileges of
securing the definitions of our law."
"Courts, 15 C.J. pp. 919 and 959; Courts, 21 C.J.S. p. 326.
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is asserted is not too important. It is a valid principle and cuts
across all fields of law because it deals with those who act under
the law. But reliance is not always nor necessarily a controlling
principle. It yields to superior principles, e.g., those dealing
with public health, safety, and welfare, among others. Reliance
is seldom valid in the tort or criminal field, and there are instances of unsocial though not illegal acts to which the principle
does not lend itself. Some examples follow.
Where a conveyance of land is made upon an oral trust in
favor of the transferor or upon an oral contract to reconvey to
the transferor and the transferee relying on the Statute of Frauds
refuses to perform the trust or contract, American courts have
adopted conflicting views.' The majority allow the transferee
to keep the land free from any trust; the minority declare the
transferee a constructive trustee. Now suppose an American
court holding the majority view becomes convinced of the unsoundness of its position and wishes to abandon it. Giving
prospective application will free the court from the bugaboo of
interfering with vested property rights. But suppose the court
gives its overruling decision retroactive effect thus allowing the
return of the property to the grantor. Can it be urged that the
grantee (defendant) has justifiably relied on precedent and so
prevent this? Even if the grantee were fully aware of this
aspect of the law of trusts, his profiting by his own wrong is
sufficiently unsocial (or immoral) to vindicate a court in finding that this reliance is not justifiable. In any event, inquiry by
the court is pertinent on the matter of reliance." In cases like
this, retroactive effect could be given in most instances without
harming the defendant, for it is quite unlikely he can show justifiable reliance on the precedents. And if the "reward. ..feature
is recognized, then the plaintiff's case is weighted that much
more in his favor.
In regard to a defectively organized corporation lacking
even the elements of a de facto corporation, the rule is that under
some circumstances the one contracting with this organization
can hold the stockholders liable as partners. Suppose a jurisdiction providing for such liability determines to abolish that rule.
Obviously, prospective application provides a means of considering the rule on its merits and allowing for a change without interfering with vested rights. But again the inquiry into reliance
Scotr, TRusTs (1st ed. 1939) § 44, p. 246.
"Reliance is a mixed question of law and fact.
"That is, the one who brings the action, other things being equal, ought
to be "rewarded" by getting retroactive effect so that he prevails.
401
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is pertinent. Clearly, unless the contracting party knew of this
phase of corporation law, he can hardly claim to have entered
into the transaction in reliance on it. The granting of retroactive application would not in reality be taking anything away
from him which he himself ever expected to have. The mere fact
such a precedent existed is no reason why he should be allowed
to avail himself of it as a legal windfall. Further, if retroactive
application is denied, stockholders find themselves burdened with
an obligation they never intended and in many instances were
never aware existed. Instances like these present a clear case for
the court to exercise a "wise judicial discretion" as the equities
appear. "
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins" illustrates a situation where
the reliance of those other than the litigants might properly have
been considered. And this on the basis, although the action itself was one in tort for personal injury, that there was a much
broader interest involved. The Court itself posed the interest as
being: "The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson " shall now be disapproved."" Here
Tompkins was walking on a longitudinal pathway which ran
close to the tracks at the point where he was injured by something projecting from one of the moving cars. According to the
common law of Pennsylvania (where the injury occurred) Tompkins was a trespasser rather than a licensee and as to him the
railroad was liable only for injuries resulting from wanton or
wilful negligence, which admittedly this was not. In the New
York Federal District Court the verdict was for Tompkins. The
United States Supreme Court reversed thereby overruling the almost century-old doctrine of Swift v. Tyson which was to the effect that the federal courts were free to exercise an "independent judgment" as to what the common law of any state was. In
speaking of this case Mr. Frank W. Grinnel said:
"Of course, an injured trespasser could hardly be
considered as having 'equitable' claim based on 'reliance' on Swift v. Tyson when he trespassed; but the inhabitants of the forty-eight states whose actions for
many years had involved actual 'reliance' on the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson might well have been protected,
"This and the previous example were suggested by Carpenter in Stare
Deciai8 and Law Reform, 1 So. OALIF. L. REv. 53 (1927). Several other
situations are also discussed there.
"304 U.S. 65, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 58 S.Ct. 817, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
"16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842).
"304 U.S. at p. 69.
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as to the past, by an equitable clause in the overruling
opinion as to its general application.''
The same writer in calling attention to the fact that Justice
Cardozo" took no part in the consideration or decision of the
Erie case says:
"This is unfortunate for his appreciation of the
equitable trend in the development of the doctrine of
precedent might have resulted either in a separate suggestive opinion, or a modification of the retrospective
application of the majority opinion.'
The "reliance" element in this case is entirely separate from
the tort which happened to be the vehicle used to bring the action
before the court. The significance attributed in the case to the
roles of the state and federal courts is what makes reliance important.
Let us now consider the case of Continental Supply Co. v.
Abell' in which the matter of reliance on previous decisions was
made a virtually conclusive presumption.' Here a statute imposing personal liability on directors of corporations for failure
to file an annual report within a certain time was amended and
there was no saving clause in the amending statute. The amendment was to take effect on July 1 whereas liability under the old
statute would attach if no report were filed by March 1. In
' upra, n. 15 at p. 156.
"Kocourek and Koven,

upra, n. 8 at p. 993, quote the following from

Cardozo reported in 55 Rep. of N.Y. State Bar Assn. at p. 293 (1932) :

"The objection will be made that courts are without power to tie
the hands of their successors by a declaration of purpose not wrought
into a judgment. If I conceive the situation justly they are untying
and releasing. A fair paraphrase of what they say Is this: 'The rule
that we are asked to apply is out of tune with the life about us. It
has been made discordant by the forces that generate a living law.
We apply it to this case because the repeal might work hardship to
those who have trusted to its existence. We give notice, however,
that anyone trusting to it hereafter will do so at his peril. Much of
the evasion, the pretense, the shallow, and disingenuous distinctions
too often manifest in opinions--distinctions made in the laudable
endeavor to attain a just result while preserving a semblance of consitency-would disappear from our law forever if there were such a
statute on the books [suggested in 17 A. B. A. Joua 180 but made unnecessary by the Sunburst decision.] Thus would 8tare decisis retain
what it has of value, retain its stabilizing virtue and be purged of its
congealing humors."
"Grinnel, supra, n. 15 at p. 156.
095 Mont. 148, 24 P. (2d) 133 (1933).
51d., p. 171, the court saying:

"It is unnecessary that it be shown that reliance was actually placed
by defendants upon the former decisions. Reliance thereon will be presumed."
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previous decisions' the court had decided that where there was
an amendment of a statute fixing the liability and the amending
statute had a general repealing clause with no saving clause as
to a right of action previously accrued, it must be considered as
if the liability had never existed if no action were brought before
the amendment became effective. Plaintiff contended that the
strict construction placed on the statutes in the previous decisions
was wrong and that the statutes if liberally construed would give
a different result. The court in the Abell case agreed, expressly
overruled the previous cases, and decided in favor of the plaintiff. On defendants' motion for rehearing the rule was changed
to accord with the Horse Products case of applying prospectively only so that the defendants prevailed. This case appears to
have been one where an inquiry into the matter of reliance
might profitably have been made. The decision to overrule was
unanimous; on the rehearing which granted prospective application only, it was three to two." The dissent in full was: "Being
convinced of the correctness of the original opinion, we dissent
from any modification thereof." '
Looking more closely into the facts we find that the defendants' liability arose upon their default March 1, 1927, and continued, if no action were brought, only to July first of the same
year according to three previous decisions on the point. Not
until some two years later did plaintiff bring the action. Even
if retroactive effect were granted in this case, the court could
possibly have denied plaintiff relief on the basis of laches."
However, it appears more likely that it was the defendants who
knew of and relied on their escape from liability because of plain"Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223, 207 P. 116
(1922) ; First National Bank of Brockton v. Cosier, 66 Mont. 352, 213
P. 442 (1923) ; and First National Bank of Plains v. Barto, 72 Mont.
437, 233 P. 963 (1925).
"Supra, n. 14.
"The explanation of this being that the court was fully convinced of the
unsoundness of the precedent and there was unanimity on the matter of
overruling. But on being urged to give prospective application only to
the overruling decision, a difference arose. Since the dissenting judges
failed to state their position on the effect to be given an overruling
decision, and since the majority had not changed its mind on -the desirability of overruling but only on the effect to be given, this seems to
have supplied a situation where inquiry into the matter of reliance
would have been worthwhile.
'Supra, n. 50.
"Admittedly not under the usual view of the doctrine of laches, for as
the state of the law stood, the plaintiff for two years had no rights,
i.e., plaintiff acquired no rights until the overruling decision was announced, and could not be held to be sleeping upon rights which did not

exist.
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tiff's failure to sue them by July first. The degree of that reliance could have been the controlling feature. It is quite possible
that had plaintiff sued shortly after July first the defendants'
reliance would have been inconsequential; that "expectations"
would be the most they could be said to have had. This also
seems to have been a situation where, if the "reward" principle
were recognized, retroactive effect could well have been given
the overruling decision.
While every man is presumed to know the law, no man is
expected to be clairvoyant; reliance, therefore, is something
which must be left to the courts to work out as a practical matter.
Tedious and protracted inquiries could easily bog down the whole
judicial process in side issues. The feasibility of the inquiry and
the fruits to be obtained therefrom should be the guiding factors.
A presumption of reliance ought to be rebuttable rather than
conclusive lest the effect to be given an overruling decision again
become crystallized. The important thing is that the door be not
closed to granting retroactive effect to an overruling decision
under the proper circumstances and that courts be alert to discover when such circumstances exist.
Even at this early stage of the development of the Montana
Doctrine courts are not without some guides. By whatever theory
the particular case was justified, the municipal bond and legal
tender cases with their multitudinous progeny have firmly established the fact that where statutory or constitutional provisions
are construed, any change in construction is to be given prospective effect only.' Equally as well settled, and by many of the
same cases since the two very frequently intertwine, is the proposition that where property or contract rights have vested, any
change affecting them will be given prospective effect only.'
Subject to the rule that no criminal has a vested right in rules
which have been erroneously sanctioned, prospective application
only is given to changes in procedure both civil' and criminal.'
5See cases listed, supra, n. 7. And the Duhame, Kern and Oklahoma
County cases, supra n. 16.
'See the Farrior, Muhlker and Hill cases, supra, n. 7; and World Fire &
Marine Insurance case, 8upra, n. 16. For an astounding departure on
this proposition see Carter Oil Co. v. Weil, 209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W. (2d)
215, citing Sunburst case in dissent at p. 222 (1946).
'9Norton v. Crescent City Ice, supra, n. 16. Indeed, in Barker v. St. Louis
County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W. (2d) 371 (1937), it is held that only
where adjective law is involved can prospective effect be given. But
this distinction between adjective and substantive law is not valid
where prospective application is the point under consideration. This
case cites Sunburst on p. 378.
'State v. Simanton, 100 Mont. 292, 49 P. (2d) 981 (1935).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/8

16

Stimatz: Stare Decisis —The Montana Doctrine

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
It is also quite apparent that in regard to some torts retroactive
application is to be given. It is fanciful to think of a person acting
negligently in reliance on precedent; accidents occur so quickly
that there is no time to consider a course of action. Changing of
a rule of liability to extend its scope is generally productive of
no injustice to the defendant since he already knows he is responsible for negligent acts, and if he deliberately or knowingly is
crowding the line separating permissive from responsible action,
a court which has decided to enlarge the scope of liability may
find such acts of the defendant to be so unsocial as to preclude
any possibility of reliance. But in cases of libel or slander, where
advice of counsel is sought as to what can safely be published
and the advice accords with the law as announced by the decisions, a change in decision could well be limited to prospective
effect only. Since criminal law deals almost exclusively with
constitutions and statutes any changes in decisions are limited
to prospective application. Thus, though the courts are faced
with a difficult task, they are not entirely without aid. They
are not in an uncharted wilderness; there are some pathways
even if but faintly blazed.
To view the doctrine of stare decisis in proper perspective,
it is helpful to realize some of the things it is as well as some of
the things it is not. As to the doctrine of precedents, Dean Pound
says:
[It] is a part of the technique which has developed in the courts in the English speaking world. It
represents experience developed by reason and reason
tried and tested by experience. Now a great deal of the
trouble that the layman finds with the doctrine of
precedent grows out of, as I see it, an entire misunderstanding of what we are doing. The layman seems to
think a certain number of cases were decided back in the
time of the Plantagenets and were laid down in a fossilized state in the Middle Ages and from time to time are
dug up and are used as the measure of decision in controversies of Twentieth Century America.'
"Nor does the doctrine require or demand continued and
servile adherence to any and all precedents. It permits growth
ordered and planned. But the doctrine of stare decisis refuses
to concede that change necessarily connotes progress. '
Further, this doctrine is intended to keep us under "a gov6114 CINN. L. Rzv. at p. 329 (see supra,n. 15).
'Kennedy, Portraitof the New Supreme Court, 14 FoRD.L. Rzv. 8 (1945).
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ernment of laws and not of men, " as well expressed by these
words:
"In aeronautics, stability means the maintenance of
flight on an even keel without pitching or rolling. The
American theory of precedents seeks to achieve stability
in that sense-that is, in the sense of regulated progress
rather than immobility or movement without direction
....At the same time the boundaries of flexibility should

be delimited for litigants, lawyers and law courts, by
the overruling of precedents only in instances where the
change fits into the overall pattern of progress, so that
the law is in the spirit of the times rather than in the
spirit of the judge who happens to decide or whose vote
happens to be decisive.""
The prospective overruling of decisions allows stare decisis
to serve future needs as well as to furnish a current stabilizing
link with the past. The importance of the Montana Court's decision in the Sunburst case defies valuation. It has been said that
the case "seems likely to become a landmark in legal history."'
Another writer has called the Sunburst decision "a commendable determination . . . that a court never acts so much like a

court as when it combines the duty of setting forth correct doctrines with the protection of litigants who have reasonably come
to rely on doctrines not quite so good. ""
The Montana court in a sharp, decisive stroke cut the fetters
of retroactive necessity which had been restricting the common
law. That action gives promise of achieving "not only a renovation of the common law but possibly a renaissance of the common
law that will carry us forward to a level higher than ever reached
by any system of law. "' With constitutional and theoretical
difficulties swept out of the way, the energy and "attention of
courts and lawyers should be directed to working out definitive
applications of the principle of reliance in connection with overruled and overruling decisions." ' " It attaches a challenge and
a duty which cannot be passed on to the legislature.'
'Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch at 163 (1803).
"Sprecher, mpra, n.15 at p. 509.
'Grinnell, 8upra, n.15 at p. 150.
'Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CoaN. L. Q. 155 (1946).
'Kocourek and Koven, supra,n. 8 at p. 999.
"Snyder, 8upra, n. 8 at p. 153.
"'"No legislature, no matter how wise or expert, nor court either, for that
matter, can make rules of law so adequate that they will not work
harsh injustice in some instances when applied to particular cases. ...
Judge-made law has the decided advantage in this respect for it is
possible to modify the rule so as not to make an improper sacrifice of
justice for the sake of maintaining the rule.... The whole body of the
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By way of summation, the general rule is that an overruling
decision is to be given retroactive effect; that exceptions to this
rule exist where contract or property rights have vested, where
a statutory or constitutional provision is being construed, where
personal rights in criminal cases are involved. The Sunburst decision is the leading case in the growing equitable tendency toward granting prospective effect only. The chief obstacle to
general acceptance of the Montana Doctrine still seems to be the
declaratory theory that a judge declares not makes law. This
the courts still feel themselves bound to follow despite the harsh
results often engendered and despite the fact that the Sunburst
case indicates that there is no constitutional objection nor common law limitation on the power of courts to grant either retroactive or prospective application. Since there are instances
when retroactive effect is called for, the determination of which
is to be based on the "principle of reliance," it would seem that
in the interest of doing effective justice the general rule ought
to be prospective overruling, with retroactive overruling the exception.
Existing in four broad categories of (1) constitutional and
statutory construction, (2) vested contract and property rights,
(3) procedure, and (4) torts, is a guide by which courts can be
aided in developing this new judicial technique. Eventually in
each category, situations of justifiable reliance will be indicated
and ultimately can be listed in an ascending-descending degree of
importance. But this determination of the effect to be given an
overruling decision, lying so peculiarly within the power and
abilities of the courts, is a task and a duty which ought not to be
shunted to the legislature.
LAWRENCE G. STIMATZ
TRUST OR DEBT?
A REVIEW OF MONTANA DECISIONS
Courts have not consistently answered the question of
whether a given transaction creates a trust or a debt. A trust
and a debt are fundamentally different, and it is important to
distinguish between them where the claimant is seeking a preference.
In some cases courts have disregarded the distinctions becommon law having been evolved in a process of application of rules

to particular cases, has a ...fitness to the actualities of life that no

body of legislative rules made in a priori fashion can have."-Carpen-

ter, supra, n. 43 at p. 63.
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